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the total of 57 in the class, 18 have college degrees, 3 have had 4 years
of college work, 28 have had three years, 5 have had two years under
the temporary exception in the trustees' regulation setting up a three-
year entrance requirement, and 3 are special students.
The visiting professors in the summer session of 1933 included:
Ralph Fuchs, Washington University, St. Louis; Albert C. Jacobs,
Columbia University; Roscoe Turner Steffen, Yale University; and
William E. McCurdy, Harvard University. Professor R. H. Wettach
spent the summer teaching Constitutional Law and Conflict of Laws
at the Northwestern University Law School. Professor M. S.
Breckenridge was again engaged in research for the Interstate Com-
merce Committee of the House of Representatives. Professor Albert
Coates is absent on leave during the fall semester in order that he
may devote his time to the Institute of Government.
The University of North Carolina Press has just published
Lynching and the Law by Assistant Professor J. H. Chadbourn. It
is a study of the operation and effectiveness of the judicial process
and the special legislation in relation to lynching, and concludes with
a suggested model anti-lynching law for adoption by the several
states. The study is the fruit of three years of co6peration between
the Law School and the Southern Commission on Lynching.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Delegation of Legislative Power to President
Under National Industrial Recovery Act.
The provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act which
tend to effectuate its policy are to be found in those sections which
provide for the promulgation of compulsory codes and the issuance
of licenses upon the discovery of specified abuses.' Congress has
put both these weapons into the hands of the President, and this in-
quiry concerns the validity of such delegation as tested by precedent. 2
'48 STAT. 196 (d) (1933), 151 U. S. C. A. §703 (d) and 48 STAT. 197 (b)
(1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §704 b). The scope of this note is confined to the
question of delegation. For the purposes of discussion, it is assumed that Con-
gress had the power to pass the act as to its other aspects.
The cases examined yield no clear cut definition of what is or is not
legislative. In the last analysis, it 'would seem that the outcome of each case
depends on the attitude of the court upon the question involved in the particular
legislation. See Parke v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 S. 28 (1920) ("The limits
beyond which a legislative may go havenever been clearly defined").
NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is asserted as a truism that there can be no delegation of legis-
lative power a But such prohibition is said to include only the leg-
islative prerogative of policy forming.4  Any power not legislative
in character which the legislature may exercise, it may delegate. 5
Such delegations of power as the following have been upheld: fact
finding,6 the making of rules and regulations, even where the legis-
lature has provided that these violations shall be punishable,7 the
working out of administrative details8 and a determination of whether
the occasion exists for executing the law.9
One of the tests of the validity of such delegation is the "com-
pleteness of the statute."' 0 Some say, if the subject matter has been
acted upon as far as is practical, the statute will be upheld." It has
' Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892) ; Com-
monwealth v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S. W. 1086; Durham
Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N. C. 7, 128 S. E. 593 (1925).
' Parker v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 So. 28 (1920) ; State v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908) ; State v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455,
150 S. E. 269 (1929).
U. S. v. Grimand, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. ed. 563 (1910);
Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565 (1908) ; Monroe v.
Withycombe,-84 Ore. 328, 165 P. 227 (1917).
'Union Bridge Co.. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 361, 51 L. ed. 523(1907) ; Monongahella Bridge Co. v. U. S. 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 54
L. ed. 435 (1910) ; J. W. Hampton & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct.
348, 72 L. ed. 624 (1928) , Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 258
Fed. 307, 169 C. C. A. 323 (1919); Amchanitsky v. Carrougher, 3 Fed. Supp.
999 (E. D. N. Y. (1933) (In this case the Economy Act of Congress, 5 U. S.
C. A. §673, providing for the reduction of Federal employers' salaries, is held
constitutional).
'U. S. v. Grimand, supra note 5; I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.
194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729 (1912) ; United States v. Calisbad Packers,
4 Fed. Supp. 660 (N. D. Col. 1933) (The Agricultural Adjustment Act [7 U. S.
C. A. §§601-619] is not unconstitutional because of an invalid delegation of
legislative power) ; State v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969(1908) (The Commission itself may not prescribe a penalty) ; Durham Pro-
vision Co. v. Daves, supra note 3.
'I); re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, 41 L. ed. 813 (1897) (design
of stamp used for oleomargarine) ; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851(1901) (number and location of fire escapes); Steele v. Louisville & M. R.
Co., 54 Tenn. 208, 285 S. W. 582 (1926) (designate form of railroad crossing
sign).
'U. S. v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1, 71 L. ed. 131(1926).
" People v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. 1108 (1931) ; Welton v. Hamilton,
344.1IU. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (1931) (The term "complete" is used to mean almost
anything. It may mean merely a declaration of policy exists in the statute or,
as in this case, it may include the existence of a policy and a sufficient standard
to carry it into effect) ; Steele v. Louisville & M. R. Co., supra note 8. (The
maxim that the law must be complete when coming from the legislature means
that the duties or privileges must be definitely fixed or determined or rules for
fixing and determining them clearly established).
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. ed. 525
(1904).
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also been said that the permissibility of delegation may vaty with the
scope and authority of the delegating body.12 But the most frequent
inquiry is the existence of a standard definite enough to effectuate
the legislative will. It is generally said that the statute should pre-
scribe a definite rule of action for the guidance of any discretionary
power conferred.' 3 But even in such cases the precision of a crim-
inal statute is not required. 1 4 An exception to the above rule is recog-
nized where the problem involved is technical' 5 or where it is difficult
or impractical to lay down some definite rule.' 6 Even where such
special conditions do not exist, some courts accept the most flimsy of
standards. 17 Still other courts have held that a general standard
can be dispensed with entirely since exercise of a reasonable dis-
cretion will be implied.' 8
In the past, the tendency in administrative licensing, has been
towards a greater observation of the requirement of a fixed standard,
than in other administrative functions. The doctrine is frequently
re-iterated that a statute which purports to vest an absolute dis-
cretion in an official to license a lawful enterprise is invalid.' 9 There
must be a uniform rule of action except where it is difficult or im-
practical to establish one.2 0 A liberal delegation of discretion is
also considered appropriate where the regulation of the government's
"Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353 (1869).
' Welton v. Hamilton, supra note 10; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212
Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565 (1908).
" Tarpay v. McClure, 190 Cal. 521, 213 P. 983 (1923); State v. Public
Service Com. 94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917).
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, 68 L. ed. 549 (1924) ; U. S.
v. Cohen Grocery Co. 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup, Ct. 298, 65 L. ed. 516 (1921).
'Avent v. U. S. 266 U. S. 127, 45 Sup. Ct. 34, 69 L. ed. 202 (1924);
Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, supra note 13.
; Red C. Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 32 Sup. Ct. 152, 56 L. ed.
240 (1912) (oil to be safe, pure and to afford satisfactory light); Mahler v.
Eby, supra note 14 (undesirable residents) ; New York Central Securities Co.
v. U. S., 287 U. S. 12, 53 Sup. Ct. 45 (1932) (Public interest) ; Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., supra note 6 (authority to stop unfair methods
of competition); Spencer-Sturta Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290
S. W. 608 (1927) (the ordinance by requiring the board to follow "fundamen-
tal purpose and intent of the ordinance," provided sufficient guide); State
ex rel Central Steam Heat & Pr. Co. v. Gettle, 196 Wisc. 1, 220 N. V/. 201
(1898.)
State v. Whitman, 196 Wisc. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928).
Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886);
Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen of City of Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 135 S. E.
50 (1926) ; Village of St. Johnsbury v. Aron, 103 Vt. 22, 151 Atl. 650 (1930);
Thompson v. Smith 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579 (1930).
" Mutual Film Corp. v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. ed. 552
(1915) (due to numerous types of pictures, it would be impossible to devise
language which would be comprehensive and automatic); Ex parte Whitley,
144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac. 879 (1904) ; State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750
(1904).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
own resources are concerned.2 1 On the other hand, in businesses
which are a matter of privilege rather than of right, a larger dis-
cretion is granted in order to protect the public health, morals, safety
or welfare.22 Statutes are upheld which confer authority to make
rules and regulations and to license in pursuance to them. 28  And in
the licensing of both lawful pursuits and those within the police
power, where there is no uniform rule or even the existence of a
general one, the discretion conferred is often upheld on the ground
that a public official will be presumed to exercise his power impar-
tially and according to law.2 4 As a result of such attitude, the
courts will not pass on the validity of a licensing act, on the ground
that too much discretion has been given, unless there has been a
dereliction by officials in refusing a license.25
There has been a growing trend to hold those cases of delegated
powers which have heretofore been in the twilight zone of uncer-
tainty, valid. It is pointed out that such shift of view is necessi-
tated by the complex situations created by modern society and busi-
ness. 26 The question is no longer whether there has been an invalid
delegation of power, but whether such delegation is necessary and
expedient due to the limited time and necessarily restricted knowl-
edge of the legislature and whether it is in the interest of greater
speed, efficiency, elasticity, and justice.2 7
' Dastervigres v. U. S., 122 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903) ; Port Royal Min-
ing Co v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 (1889); Vail v. Seaborg, 120
Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922).
Davis v. Mass., 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897) ; State
v. Sherow, 87 Kans. 235, 123 Pac. 866 (1912) ; State v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 681, 286
S. W. 363 (1926) ; State v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 64, 225, Pac. 647 (1924).
1 First Natl. Bk. v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734, 61 L.
ed. 1233 (1917) ; State Racing Com. v. Latoma Agri. Assoc., 136 Ky. 173, 123
S. W. 681 (1909).
Lieberman v. Van deCarr, 199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 50 L. ed. 305
(1905) ; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. 190, 55 L. ed. 128 (1911);
Hall v. Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. ed. 480 (1917);
Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80 (1911). (The courts are bound to'
take for granted the honesty and right mindedness of public officials chosen
directly or indirectly by the people to administer the law).
I Interstate Buses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U. S. 45, 47 Sup. Ct.
298, 71 L. ed. 530 (1927) ; Alaska Gold Mining Co. v. Territory of Alaska, 236
Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); People v. Globe Grain & Milling Co.; 80 Cal.
625, 294 Pac. 3 (1930).
' Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321 (1917) ; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal
Trade Com., supra note 6; State ex rel Jonason v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99
N. W. 636 (1904) ; Dillon Catfish Drainage District v. Bk. of Dillon, 143 S. C.
178, 141 S. E. 274 (1928); State v. Moorer, supra note 4; State v. Public
Service Com., supra note 15.
'Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S., supra note 6; Mutual Film Corp. v.
Kansas, supra note 20; Avent v. U. S., supra note 16; J. W. Hampton, Jr. and
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From all the foregoing one can only conclude that the provisions
in question are valid. The act starts with an extensive declaration
of policy, so that nothing essentially legislative has been left un-
done.28 The power to impose a compulsory code is to be exercised
only where it can be shown that there are abuses inimical to the
public interest and contrary to the policy of the act.29 And the
President is to license a business, only when it appears that it is
engaged in destructive price or wage cutting.3 0 The exercise of both
these powers is further limited by the requirement that any license
or code shall contain certain specified conditions.8 1 And in addition
the procedure to be used in arriving at these conditions is delin-
eated.3 2 The licensing power is further curtailed by the provision
that it shall expire within a year. Moreover, should anyone doubt
that the standard fixed is more than sufficient, would it not seem
reasonable to indulge in the presumption that the President will act
with fairness commensurate with the dignity of his office? There
are also cases available which sustain the delegation of unusually
large powers during periods of emergency 8 3 However, could the
provisions not be upheld under the most orthodox tenets, ample
justifications for them could still be found in the existing crisis and
sufficient precedent in the legislation enacted during the World War.
4
And finally, since the nondelegibility of legislative power is largely a
myth, why should it not be openly discarded by the courts ?
CEcirLa L. Pirz.
Co. v. U. S., supra note 6; State of Wisc. v. State of Ill. & Sanitary District
of Chicago, 278 U. S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 73 L. ed. 426 (1929).
'48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701.
248 STAT. 196 (a) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (a).
2048 STAT. 197 (b) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §704 (b).
148 STAT. 198 (a) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §707 (a).
SN. I. R. A. §7 (b), 7 (c). Id. (b) & (c).
"Avent v. U. S. supra note 16; Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, 59 F. (2d)
437 (D. C. Ill. 1932) ; City of Chicago v. Mariotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N. E. 369(1928); Blue v. Beach, 195 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89 (1900).
"New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U. S. 262, 282, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76
L. ed. 747 (1932) (dissent of Brandeis, J., "the people of the United States are
now confronted with an emergency more serious than war.") Selective Draft
Law Cases 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349; (1918) ; U. S. v. Ford,
265 Fed. 424 (S. D. Ohio 1920); 40 U. S. Stat. L. 277, Chapter 53 §5 (Wilson
given the authority to regulate by licensing the importation, manufacture,
storage, mining or distribution of any necessaries); HART, THE ORmNANCE
MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIMENT OF U. S.
'Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas E. L. & Pr. Co.; 19 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908) ("The true meaning of constitutional division of gov-
ernmental powers being that the whole power of one of the three shall not be
exercised by the same hands which possess the power of either of other two,
there being no objection to the imposition on an administrative body of some
powers legislative in character.")
